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1 Introduction
The last couple of years have witnessed a surge of academic as well as
journalistic writings on tax evading activities.1 One reason for this interest
is that tax evasion opportunities create various distortions in the behaviour
of economic agents. For example, too much work may be carried out in
the informal sector if consumer wages are relatively higher in this sector.2
In this paper we argue that also the choice to acquire higher education
may be distorted by tax evasion opportunities. If workers with a lower
level of education to a larger extent face job opportunities in an infor-
mal sector, there are less incentives to acquire higher education. More
informal job opportunities, higher taxes or lower punishment fees, reduces
the relative pay-oﬀ from education; less workers will educate themselves.
This hypotheses is consistent with data. For example, while using survey
data of the shadow sector in Sicily, Boeri and Garibaldi (2002) show that
mainly workers at the lower end of the skill distribution engage in informal
activities. In addition Smith and Pedersen (1998), using comprehensive
survey data, show that almost half of the informal sector activities in Den-
mark are carried out within the construction sector. They also find that
around 70 percent of the total hours performed in the informal sector is
carried out within the service sector or construction sector.
The aim of this paper is threefold. First, we want to examine how
the government tax and punishment policies of the informal sector aﬀects
the incentives to acquire higher education. Second, we want to examine
how labour market performance, including wage formation, unemploy-
ment, wage dispersion, and the size of the informal sector is aﬀected by
tax and punishment policies. Third, we aim at characterizing the optimal
tax and punishment system.
To that end, we develop a three-sector general equilibrium model fea-
turing matching frictions and worker-firm wage bargains. Workers diﬀer in
ability and decide whether or not to acquire higher education. We assume
that it is costly in terms of eﬀort to acquire higher education, implying
that only high ability workers find this worthwhile. Workers who choose
not to acquire higher education, whom we refer to as manual workers, face
job opportunities in both the formal and the informal sector. Unemployed
1See Slemrod and Yitzhaki (2002) and Schneider and Eneste (2000) for two recent
surveys of tax avoidence and tax evasion.
2See Pedersen and Smith (1998) for evidence for Denmark.
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manual workers search for jobs in both sectors by allocating their search
eﬀort optimally between them.
We find that increased government punishment of the informal sec-
tor reduces the size of this sector. Moreover, the number of unemployed
workers is likely to fall, formal wage dispersion increases, and the number
of highly educated workers increases. While considering welfare, we find
that it is optimal to choose the punishment rates so to more than fully
counteract the distortion created by the government’s inability to tax the
informal sector.
Early theoretical analyses of tax evasion are provided by Allingham
and Sandmo (1972) and Srinivasan (1973), where underreporting of in-
come is modeled as a decision made under uncertainty. Subsequent papers
have enhanced the basic model of individual behaviour by, for example,
incorporating endogenous labour supply decisions.3 Also general equilib-
rium models with tax evasion have been developed (for an excellent exam-
ple see Cremer and Gahvari (1993)). Several theoretical papers have also
recognized that the opportunities for tax evasion diﬀer across occupations.
See for example Watson (1985), Pestieu and Possen (1991), and Jung et
al. (1994). Occupational choice in this literature is usually thought of as
a choice between self-employment, where underreporting is possible, and
regular employment, where underreporting is not an option. Pestieu and
Possen (1991) assume that workers choose either to be entrepreneurs or
regular employees. Workers diﬀer in risk aversion and underreporting is
only available for entrepreneurs. They argue that tax evasion should be
allowed to some degree in order to maintain a large stock of productive
entrepreneurs.
The principal contribution of the analyses in this paper is that we shed
light on that the presence of work opportunities in an informal sector can
aﬀect the educational attainment in an economy. This has, to our knowl-
edge, not been explored in the previous literature. Another important con-
tribution is that we incorporate an imperfectly competitive labour market.
This facilitates an analysis of how tax and punishment policies aﬀect wage
setting and unemployment. Previous research is mainly conducted within
the public finance tradition. In this literature wages are either assumed to
be fixed or determined by market clearing, and by definition, such frame-
work is unable to examine how involuntary unemployment is aﬀected by
3See for example Andersen (1977) and Sandmo (1981) for early contributions of
endogenous labour supply and underreporting of income.
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tax and punishment policies. There has, however, been some recent stud-
ies of how tax and punishment policies aﬀect involuntary unemployment;
see Kolm and Larsen (2001,2002), Cavalcanti (2002), Boeri and Garibaldi
(2002) and Fugazza and Jacques (2003). This paper diﬀers from these
previous studies in that it does not rely on relative price adjustments (as
Kolm and Larsen (2001, 2002) and Cavalcanti (2002)) or heterogeneity
in moral and a fixed number of vacancies as Fugazzi and Jacques (2003),
to generate a stable equilibrium where both formal and informal jobs co-
exist. Neither does it rely on that informal jobs only comes about as
matched formal jobs are hit by a bad productivity shock, as Boeri and
Garibaldi (2002), in order to generate coexistence of formal and informal
jobs. Rather this paper assumes directed search where the unemployed
workers are optimally allocating search eﬀort into both the formal and
the informal sector. We assume that the eﬀectiveness of search falls with
search time into a sector; see the parallel with a production function. This
could capture that diﬀerent search methods are used when searching for
a job in a market. The more time that is used in order to search in a
market, the less eﬃcient search methods have to be used.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model. Sec-
tion 3, examines how the equilibrium variables (e.g. tightness, wages, wage
dispersion, employment and unemployment rates, unemployment stock,
and the stock of educated workers) are aﬀected by a fully financed change
in the punishment system. Section 4 concerns the optimal design of tax
and punishment policies. Section 5 concludes.
2 The Model4
The economy consists of a labour force which diﬀers in ability to acquire
education. Abilities, e, are uniformly distributed between 0 and 1, e ∈
[0, 1]. Based on ability, the workers decide whether or not to educate
themselves. We assume that it is costless to become a manual worker, but
that workers who educate themselves find it costly to do so.5 The costs of
education, c(e) is decreasing in ability, c0(e) < 0.
Manual workers face job opportunities in both a formal and an informal
sector, whereas highly educated workers only face employment opportu-
4The model is along the line of Pissarides 2000.
5This is a simplyfying assumption, allowing us to focus on the choice inbetween two
skill levels.
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nities in a formal sector.6 The economy thus consists of three sectors; the
formal manual sector (denoted the formal sector F ), the informal man-
ual sector (denoted the informal sector I), and the highly educated sector
(denoted h). The formal and the informal sector employ manual workers,
whereas employment in sector h requires higher education. Manual work-
ers have productivity ym and highly educated workers have productivity
yh > ym.
2.1 Manual Workers
2.1.1 Matching
The manual workers search for jobs in the formal and the informal sector.
For simplicity, we assume that only unemployed workers search for jobs.
This is a simplification, i.e. we do not acknowledge that the connection to
the labour market given by working in the formal sector, brings about job
opportunities not available while unemployed. Workers accept job oﬀers as
long as the expected payoﬀ exceeds their reservation wage. We disregard
any moral considerations the worker could have preventing the worker
from applying for a job in the informal sector. The matching functions for
the manual sectors are given by
Xjm =
¡
vjm
¢1−η ³¡σj¢β um´η , j = F, I,
where um is the unemployment rate facing manual workers, and vjm, is the
sectorial vacancy rate. The rates are defined as the numbers relatively to
the manual labour force. Each worker’s total search intensity is exoge-
nously given and normalised to unity. Manual workers will allocate search
eﬀort optimally between the formal and the informal sector. σFdenotes
search eﬀort directed towards the formal sector, and σI denotes search
eﬀort directed towards the informal sector. To simplify notation, we let
σI = σ and σF = 1 − σ. The parameter β < 1, captures that the ef-
fectiveness of search falls with search eﬀort, i.e., the first unit of search
in one sector is more eﬀective than the subsequent units of search.7 The
6This is, of course, a simplification. But it is a simplifying assumption consistent
with the facts about in which sector informal work takes place wherefore we provided
empirical evidence in the introduction.
7This could capture that various search methods is used when searching for a job
in a market. The more time that is used in order to search, the less eﬃcient search
methods has to be used.
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transition rates into formal and informal sector employment for a particu-
lar manual worker i, are λImi = σ
β
i
¡
θIm
¢1−η
and λFmi = (1− σi)β
¡
θFm
¢1−η ,
where θFm =
vFm
(1−σ)βum
and θIm =
vIm
σβum
are labour market tightness. Labour
market tightness is measured in eﬀective search units.8 The rates at which
vacant jobs become filled are qjm =
¡
θjm
¢−η , j = F, I.
2.1.2 Value Equations
Let Um, EFm, and EIm denote the expected present values of unemployment,
and employment in the two sectors. The value functions for worker i then
reads:
rUmi = R+ λFmi(EFm − Umi) + λImi(EIm − Umi), (1)
rEFmi = R+wFmi (1− t) + s(Um −EFmi), (2)
rEImi = R+wImi (1− pδ) + (s+ p) (Um −EImi), (3)
where R is a lump sum transfer that all individuals receive from the gov-
ernment, r is the exogenous discount rate, wjm is the sector wage, and s is
the exogenous separation rate.9 For simplicity, we assume that the unem-
ployment benefits are equal to zero. The parameter t is the proportional
income tax rate, p is the probability of being detected working in the infor-
mal sector, and δ is the proportion of the evaded income the worker has to
pay as a punishment fee if detected. The match is dissolved when detected
which implies that the separation rate in the informal sector exceeds the
formal sector separation rate.
Let JFm and V Fm represent the expected present values of an occupied
job and a vacant job in the formal sector, respectively. The arbitrage
equations for a job paying the wage wFmi and a vacant job in the formal
sector are then
rJFmi = ym −wFmi (1 + z) + s(V Fm − JFmi), (4)
rV Fm = qFm(JFm − V Fm )− k, (5)
8One could, of course, choose a diﬀerent definition of tightness, for example θFm =
vFm/um and θIm = vIm/um. This is, however, of no importance for the results.
9R reflects that the government has some positive revenue requirements. For sim-
plicity, we assume that this revenue is distributed equally across the population in terms
of a lump-sum transfer or some public good.
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where z is the payroll tax rate. Vacancy costs are denoted k.
Let JIm and V Im represent the expected present values of an occupied
job and a vacant job in the informal sector. The arbitrage equations for a
job paying the wage wImi and a vacant job in the informal sector are then
rJImi = ym − wImi (1 + pα) + (s+ p) (V Im − JImi), (6)
rV Im = qIm(JIm − V Im)− k, (7)
where α is the proportion of the evaded wage the firm has to pay as a
punishment fee if detected.
The unemployed worker i allocates search between the two sectors,
σi, in order to maximise the value of unemployment, rUmi. A necessary
condition for an interior solution is satisfied as β < 1. The first order
condition can be written as:
(1− σi)1−β
(σi)1−β
=
µ
θIm
θFm
¶1−η EIm − Umi
EFm − Umi
. (8)
Workers allocate their search between sectors so that the returns to
search eﬀort is equal across the two sectors. The left-hand side of equation
(8) captures the relative eﬀectiveness of search in the two sectors, whereas
the right-hand side is the relative returns to search. The relatively tighter
the formal sector is, that is, the higher θ
F
m
θIm
is, and the larger the relative
utility gain of leaving unemployment for a formal sector job is, the larger
is formal sector search.
2.1.3 Wage Determination
When a worker and firm meet they bargain over the wage, wjmi, taking
economy wide variables as given. The first order conditions from the Nash
bargaining solutions, with the worker’s bargaining power being equal to
γ, can be written as:
γ
1− γ
1
φt
JFm = EFm − Um, (9)
γ
1− γ
1
φpJ
I
m = EIm − Um, (10)
where φt = 1+z1−t and φ
p = 1+pα1−pδ are the tax- and punishment wedges, and
where we have imposed symmetry and the free entry condition, V jm = 0,
j = F, I.
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We can now derive an equation determining how search is allocated
between the two sectors in a symmetric equilibrium by substituting (9)
and (10) into (8) and using that JFm = kqFm and J
I
m =
k
qIm
from (5) and (7)
together with free entry. This yields:
(1− σ)1−β
(σ)1−β
=
θFm
θIm
ψ, (11)
where
ψ = φ
p
φt
=
1 + pα
1− pδ /
1 + z
1− t , (12)
is the wedge between the informal sector and the formal sector. We can
interpret a ψ < 1, as if the informal sector is punished to a lesser extent
than the formal sector is taxed.10
Equation (11) is the core equilibrium equation. Recall from (8) that
workers allocate their search between sectors so that the marginal returns
to search eﬀort in the two sectors are equal. With wages being endoge-
nously determined in equilibrium, this amounts to account for the wedge,
ψ, and for diﬀerences in sectorial labour market tightness, θ
F
m
θIm
, when de-
ciding where to allocate search. For example, if formal sector tightness
exceeds informal sector tightness, this corresponds to that relatively more
open jobs are available in the formal sector and unemployed workers tend
to direct their search into the formal sector to a larger extent. If, on the
other hand, it is possible to evade taxes by working in the informal sector,
ψ < 1, unemployed workers tend to direct their search into the informal
sector to a larger extent.
By use of equation (1)-(7) and (11) in equations (9) and (10), equilib-
rium producer wages, ωjm, j = F, I, are given by:
ωFm = wFm (1 + z) = γ
Ã
ym + k
θFm
(1− σ)1−β
!
, (13)
ωIm = wIm (1 + pα) = γ
µ
ym + k
θIm
σ1−β
¶
. (14)
10 In contrast, if ψ = 1, the informal sector is punished equally hard as the formal
sector is taxed. With risk neutral individuals there is, in one sence, no substantial
diﬀerence between the tax system and the punishment system other than that the
punishment system is a randomized tax system.
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Wages increase with labour market tightness and decrease with search
intensity in each sector. This follows as a higher labour market tightness
and a smaller search intensity improve the worker’s bargaining position.
An increase in tightness makes it more easy for an unemployed worker to
find a job, and at the same time more diﬃcult for a firm to fill a vacancy.
This improves the worker’s bargaining position, resulting in higher wage
demands. An increase in search, will instead reduce the worker’s bargain-
ing position. This follows as the eﬀectiveness of search falls with more
search, i.e., β < 1. Sectorial wage demands are hence moderated with
increased search in the sector.
>From (13), (14) together with (11) it is clear that producer wages
in the formal sector exceed informal sector producer wages when ψ <
1, and vice versa when ψ > 1. Moreover, rewriting (13) and (14) in
terms of consumer wages we have that consumer wages in the formal
sector subceed informal sector consumer wages when ψ < 1, and vice
versa when ψ > 1. More specifically we have ωF − ωI = γkθ
F
(1−σ)1−β (1− ψ)
and wFm (1− t)−wIm (1− pδ) = γymφp (ψ − 1).
When conducting comparative statics analyses, it will become clear
that the results regarding how increased punishment of the informal sector
aﬀects unemployment hinges on the size of ψ. We then focus on the case
when ψ < 1, as this seems to be the most relevant case. Recall that ψ < 1
corresponds to the case where the informal sector is punished to a lesser
extent than the formal sector is taxed. Moreover, when ψ < 1, producer
wages are lower and consumer wages are higher in the informal sector,
rather than the opposite.
2.1.4 Labour Market Tightness
Labour market tightness for the formal sector and the informal sector are
determined by equation (4),(5), (6) and (7) using the free entry condition
and the wage equations (13) and (14):
k (r + s)
¡
θFm
¢η
= (1− γ) ym −
γkθFm
(1− σ)1−β
, (15)
k (r + s+ p)
¡
θIm
¢η
= (1− γ) ym −
γkθIm
σ1−β . (16)
Firms open vacancies in each sector until the discounted profits equal
the expected vacancy costs. With ψ < 1, informal producer wages are
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lower than formal producer wages and hence the expected instantaneous
profits in the informal sector exceed the instantaneous profits in the formal
sector.11 This makes it more attractive for firms to enter the informal
sector which tends to make informal tightness exceed formal tightness.
However, as the separation rate is higher in the informal sector, s+p > s,
expected job duration is longer in the formal sector. This makes the
formal sector more attractive to enter. Consequently, it is possible to
have θFm > θIm, although ψ < 1.
2.2 Sector h, highly educated workers
Highly educated workers applying for jobs in sector h do not have the
opportunity to obtain employment in an informal sector. The total time
unit of search is allocated into search in sector h, i.e., σh = 1. The matching
function is given by a standard matching function, Xh = (vh)1−η (uh)η,
where vh is the vacancy rate and uh is the unemployment rate for educated
workers. Worker and firm transition rates then become λh = (θh)1−η ,
θh = vhuh , and qh = θ
−η
h . Educated workers pay the individual educational
costs c(ei), where ei is the worker’s ability, ei ∈ [0, 1] and c0(ei) < 0.
Let Uh and Eh denote the expected present values of unemployment and
employment. The value functions for worker i then reads:12
rEhi = R+ whi (1− t) + s(Uhi −Ehi)− c(ei), (17)
rUhi = R+ λh(Eh − Uh)− c(ei). (18)
where wh denotes the wage for educated workers.
Sector h firms employ workers with the marginal productivity yh and
have the time unit probability qh of filling a vacancy. Let Jh and Vh
represent the expected present values of an occupied job and a vacant job
in the educated sector. The arbitrage equations for a job paying whi and
a vacant job in the educated sector are then:
rJhi = yh −whi (1 + z) + s(Vh − Jhi), (19)
rVh = qh(Jh − Vh)− k. (20)
11The right-hand side of equations (15) and (16), are simply the instantanous profits,
i.e., πF = ym − ωFm and πI = ym − ωIm, where we from the previous section know that
ωF − ωI = γkθ
F
(1−σ)1−β (1− ψ) .
12We assume that educational costs is costs to acquire and maintain skill. This is a
simplifying assumption and is not important for the results. This simplifying assumption
enables us to use a model without having workers being born and die.
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Wages, whi, are determined by Nash Bargaining with the workers’
bargaining power equal to γ. The first order condition can be written
analogous to equation (9). We can solve for the bargained wage by using
this first order condition and equations (17)-(20), assuming free entry,
Vh = 0, and a symmetric equilibrium:
ωh = wh (1 + z) = γ (yh + θhk) . (21)
Labour market tightness in sector h, θh, can be derived from equations
(19) and (20), using the free entry condition and the symmetry assumption
together with the wage rule in (21):
k (r + s) θηh = (1− γ) yh − γθhk. (22)
It is important to note that the tax rates t and z will have no impact
on the producer wage, and tightness in sector h.13 Tax changes will always
be absorbed by changes in the consumer wage, leaving producer wages and
tightness unaﬀected in the sector.
2.3 Education
When workers decide whether to acquire higher education or remain a
manual worker, they compare the value of unemployment as an educated
worker to the value of unemployment as a manual worker. Workers with
low ability find it too costly in terms of eﬀort to acquire higher educa-
tion, whereas high ability workers find it more than worthwhile to do so
since they face lower costs of education. The marginal worker has an
ability level, eˆ, which makes him just indiﬀerent between acquiring higher
education and remaining a manual worker. We can write the condition
determining the ability level of the marginal worker as:
rUh = rUm. (23)
We can rewrite this expression in a number of ways using earlier
equations. For example, by using equations (1)-(3), it is clear that the
value of unemployment for a manual worker is captured by rUm = R +
13This follows because we have iso-elastic preferences and a constant replacement rate
of unemployment benefits. With unemployment insurance being equal to zero, we have
both fixed benefits in real terms as well as a fixed replacement rate.
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µFmwFm (1− t)+µImwIm (1− pδ). This expression reveals that it is the con-
sumer wages in the formal and informal sector, weighted by the employ-
ment opportunities in each sector that is important for the unemployment
value of manual workers.14 A similar expression can be derived for the
value of unemployment as a educated worker; rUh = R + µhwh (1− t) −
c (e) from (17) and (18), where µh = λh/(r + s+ λh).
As wages are endogenous we can use equations (23), (1) and (18) to-
gether with the first order conditions for wages, and equations (5), (7),
(11), (20) together with the free entry condition which gives the following
simplified condition:
c (eˆ) = γ
1− γ
k
φt
Ã
θh −
θFm
(1− σ)1−β
!
. (24)
Equation (24) gives eˆ as a function of the endogenous variables θh,
θFm, and σ. Workers with e ≤ eˆ, choose not to acquire education, whereas
workers with e > eˆ acquire education. Hence, eˆ and 1 − eˆ resolve the
manual and educated labour forces, respectively. Moreover, we note that
the tax wedge, φt, has a direct eﬀect on the number of educated workers,
as well as an indirect eﬀect as ψ = φp/φt influences θF and σ. The
punishment wedge, φp, only influences eˆ through ψ.
2.4 Unemployment
Steady state employment and unemployment rates for manual and edu-
cated workers are derived by considering the flows into and out of em-
ployment. The equations determining the employment rates in the for-
mal sector and the informal sector, nFm, nIm, and the manual unemploy-
ment rate, um, are given by: λImumeˆ = (s+ p)nImeˆ, λFmumeˆ = snFmeˆ,
and nFm + nIm = 1 − um. The employment and unemployment rates, are
the number of employed and unemployed manual workers relative to the
manual labour force. The unemployment rate for manual workers that is
observable by the government, uom, is given by uom = um + nIm.
14The weights, µFm = λFm/(r + s+ λFm + r+sr+s+pλ
I
m) and µIm = λIm/(r + s+ p+ λIm +
r+s+p
r+s λ
F
m), reduce down to µFm = nFm and µIm = nIm when the discount rate approaches
zero. Consequently, with full discounting, the weights are given by the expected time a
worker will be employed in each sector.
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Solving for the employment rates, the actual and the observed unem-
ployment rates for manual workers, we obtain:
nIm =
λIm
s+p
1 + λ
I
m
s+p +
λFm
s
, nFm =
λFm
s
1 + λ
I
m
s+p +
λFm
s
, (25)
um =
1
1 + λ
I
m
s+p +
λFm
s
, uom =
1 + λ
I
m
s+p
1 + λ
I
m
s+p +
λFm
s
. (26)
For sector h, flows into unemployment and out of unemployment are
also equalised, whereby the unemployment rate among educated workers
is
uh =
1
1 + λhs
. (27)
Comparing equations (26) and (27), note that we cannot immediately
determine whether unemployment facing manual workers is higher or
lower than unemployment for educated workers. Higher productivity for
educated workers, yh > ym together with the higher average separation
rate for manual workers, tends to make um exceed uh. However, as manual
workers can apply for jobs in two sectors, which the educated worker
cannot, this tends to make uh exceed um.
The actual and oﬃcial total number of unemployed workers are there-
fore given by the following expressions:
UTOT = eˆum + (1− eˆ)uh,
UoTOT = eˆuom + (1− eˆ)uh.
2.5 Equilibrium
Equilibrium equations determining labour market tightness in the three
sectors, θFm, θIm, θh, search intensity, σ, and the number of educated work-
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ers, 1− eˆ, are summarized here for convenience
k (r + s)
¡
θFm
¢η
= (1− γ) ym −
γkθFm
(1− σ)1−β
, (28)
k (r + s+ p)
¡
θIm
¢η
= (1− γ) ym −
γkθIm
σ1−β , (29)µ
1− σ
σ
¶1−β
=
θFm
θIm
ψ, (30)
k (r + s) (θh)η = (1− γ) yh − γkθh, (31)
c (eˆ) = γ
1− γ k
1
φt
Ã
θh −
θFm
(1− σ)1−β
!
. (32)
Labour market tightness in the two sectors employing manual workers
are determined together with search intensity in (28), (29), and (30). In-
dependently, we solve for labour market tightness in sector h from (31).
Finally, the labour force allocation into manual workers and educated
workers is determined by (32) given the solutions for θFm, θh, and σ. See
the Appendix for details about stability and uniqueness.
3 Comparative Statics
This section is concerned with the impact of the tax and punishment
system on tightness, search intensity, producer wages, employment and
unemployment rates, wage dispersion, the number of unemployed workers,
and the number of educated workers. Proofs of all Propositions are given
in the Appendix.
We only consider fully financed changes in the punishment rates. Hence,
changes in the punishment rates, α or δ, is always followed by adjustments
in the tax rates, z or t, so as to balance the government budget restriction.
The government budget restriction is given by:
eˆ
µ
nFmωFm
µ
1− 1
φt
¶
+ nImωIm(1−
1
φp )
¶
+(1−eˆ) (1− uh)ωh
µ
1− 1
φt
¶
−ξ (p) = R,
(33)
where R is the exogenous government revenue requirements and ξ (p) is
auditing costs.15
15We note that the tax and punishment rates, t and z and δ and α, will not appear
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3.1 Tightness, Search Intensity, and Producer Wages
The eﬀects on tightness and allocation of search is summarized in the
following proposition.16
Proposition 1 A fully financed increase in the punishment rates, δ or α,
will reallocate search intensity towards the formal sector, σ falls, increase
tightness in the formal sector, θFm, and reduce tightness in the informal
sector, θIm. Tightness in sector h is left unaﬀected by a fully financed
change in the punishment system.
When tax evasion is punished more severely, unemployed workers will
find it optimal to reallocate their search towards the formal sector. How-
ever, when search eﬀort is reallocated towards the formal sector, wage
demands in the formal sector fall whereas wage demands in the informal
sector increase. This follows as the eﬀectiveness of search in the formal
sector falls as search increases, which weakens the worker-firm bargaining
position. In contrast, the reduced search in the informal sector increases
the eﬀectiveness of informal sector search. This improves the bargaining
position for workers in the informal sector. As the producer wage facing
informal sector firms tends to increase, and the formal sector producer
wage tends to fall, firms will exit the informal sector and enter the formal
sector; formal sector tightness increases whereas informal sector tightness
falls. As formal sector tightness raises relative to tightness in the informal
sector, search is further reallocated towards the formal sector. This eﬀect
becomes smaller and smaller until the new equilibrium is reached.
We summarize the eﬀects on producer wages in the following proposi-
tion:
Proposition 2 A fully financed increase in the punishment rates, δ or α,
will increase the producer wage in the informal sector, ωIm, and reduce the
producer wage in the formal sector, ωFm. The producer wage in sector h is
unaﬀected by changes in the tax and punishment rates.
in the government budget restriction other than through φt and φp. This reflects that
it does not matter if we tax (punish) the firm side or the worker side.
16For an intuitive intrepretation, propositions 1-4 are expressed as if an increase in
φp financed by adjustments in φt implies that ψ = φp/φt increases. Other, although
perhaps less plausible cases, are of course also incorporated. The propositions simply
capture fully financed changes in the tax and punishment systems that aﬀect the relative
tax and punishment rates, ψ, between the formal and informal economy.
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Formal sector wage demands are reduced because the worker-firm bar-
gaining position falls as search in the sector becomes less eﬀective. In
contrast, wage demands increase in the informal sector as informal sector
search becomes more eﬀective with the reduces search eﬀort in the sector.
However, there will be a dampening eﬀect on wages due to that formal
sector tightness increases and informal sector tightness falls.
3.2 Employment and Unemployment Rates
We summarize the results of the impact of the tax and punishment rates
on the employment and unemployment rates in the following proposition:
Proposition 3 A fully financed increase in the punishment rates, δ or α,
will increase the employment rate in the formal sector, nFm, and reduce the
employment rate in the informal sector, nIm. The unemployment rate for
manual workers that are observable by the government, uom, falls with the
reform. The actual unemployment rate for manual workers, um, falls with
the reform if ψ < 1. The unemployment rate for educated workers, uh, is
unaﬀected by the reform.
It comes as no surprise that increased punishment of the informal
sector induces a reallocation of manual workers from the informal towards
the formal sector. The formal sector employment rate increases as the
transition rate into formal sector employment increases. This, in turn,
is caused by the increase in formal sector tightness and the reallocation
of search eﬀort towards the formal sector. In contrast, as tightness and
search eﬀort in the informal sector fall, the transition rate into informal
employment, and consequently the sectorial employment rate, falls.
The unemployment rate for manual workers falls as workers are reallo-
cated towards the formal sector where jobs last on average a longer time.17
In addition, the oﬃcial unemployment rate falls both because the actual
unemployment rate falls, and because workers are reallocated towards the
formal sector.
17 In case ψ > 1, the number of vacancies relatively to unemployment is reduced which
will have a counteracting eﬀect on unemployment. Concequently, the unemployment
rate may increase in this case.
16 IFAU–Does tax evasion aﬀect unemployment and educational . . .
3.3 Wage Dispersion
Wage dispersion in terms of wages received by formal sector manual work-
ers and educated workers is equal to:
WD = wh − w
F
m
wFm
=
ωFh
1+z −
ωFm
1+z
ωFm
1+z
=
ωFh
ωFm
− 1.
As wage dispersion is increased whenever ωFm is reduced, we have the
following result:
Proposition 4 A fully financed increase in the punishment rates, δ or
α, will increase wage dispersion in-between formal sector manual workers
and educated workers.
Increased punishment reduces formal sector wages for manual workers
and hence increases the wage dispersion in-between educated workers and
formal sector manual workers.
3.4 Education
A closer examination of (24) reveals that changes in the punishment rates,
φp = 1+pα1−pδ , aﬀects eˆ through ψ only, whereas changes in the tax rates,
φt = 1+z1−t , have a direct eﬀect on eˆ in addition to the eﬀects working
through ψ.18 Therefore, in order to consider the eﬀects of a fully financed
change in the punishment rates on the number of educated workers, we
have to account for repercussions on eˆ following adjustments in the tax
rates; the government budget restriction has to be incorporated explicitly.
However, let us first consider the impact on 1 − eˆ of a change in the tax
and punishment rates separately:
∂ (1− eˆ)
∂φp |φt = −
γ(1−β)
1−γ k2η¡
φt
¢2D1c0 (eˆ)
Ã
η (r + s+ p)¡
θIm
¢1−η + γσ1−β
!
(r + s)
¡
θFm
¢η
(1− σ)2−β
> 0,(34)
∂ (1− eˆ)
∂φt
|φp = −ψ∂ (1− eˆ)∂φp |φt +
c (eˆ)
c0 (eˆ)φt
< 0, (35)
18Recall that the producer wage and the transition rate into employment in sector
h is independent of the tax and punishment rates. Moreover, the producer wages and
the transition rates into employment in sector F and I, only depend on the tax and
punishment rates through the wedge, ψ.
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Equation (34) shows that the number of educated workers increases
with higher punishment rates for a given tax system. This summarises
the impact on several variables. First, there is a direct eﬀect which in-
duces more workers to educate themselves as increased punishment for a
given tax system reduces the informal sector consumer wage. However,
increased punishment rates also aﬀect consumer wages through the wage
negotiations; wages are reduced in the formal sector but increased in the
informal sector. Moreover, employment opportunities increases in the for-
mal sector but falls in the informal sector. This is a consequence of the
fact that tightness and search in the formal sector increases whereas the
opposite movements take place in the informal sector. The negative im-
pact on the value of being a manual worker, rUm, dominates. Hence more
workers will educate themselves as increased punishment of the informal
sector makes it less attractive to remain a manual worker.
Equation (35) gives the impact on the number of educated workers as
the tax rates increases, for a given punishment system. The first term
captures the eﬀect on the educated labour force of an increase in the
tax rates working through ψ. Increased taxation induces the opposite
movements as was described in connection to equation (34) and analogous
reasoning can be conducted. The second term in (35) captures the impact
of increased taxation for a given wedge, ψ. Increased taxation reduces the
consumer wages for both educated and manual workers, but it will not
aﬀect the costs of higher education. Consequently, the value of being an
educated worker falls by relative more than the value of being a manual
worker; the number of educated workers falls. As the eﬀects work in
the same direction, we have that the number of educated workers in the
economy tends to decrease with increased taxation.
In order to consider fully financed increases in the punishment rates,
we need to consider the impact of the tax and punishment rates on the
government revenues. The tax and punishment rates aﬀect the govern-
ment revenues in a number of ways (details are given in an appendix).
Considering that we are located on the positively sloped side of the Laﬀer
curves, and hence dynamic adjustments in equilibrium wages, employment
rates and labour forces are not dominating the direct eﬀects, government
revenue increases with increased tax rates and punishment rates.19 An
19Or we could equally well allow for the case where we are located on the negatively
sloped side of the Laﬀer curve, and hence the direct eﬀects are dominated by the dynamic
eﬀects. See appendix for details.
18 IFAU–Does tax evasion aﬀect unemployment and educational . . .
increase in the punishment rate accordingly calls for reductions in the tax
rates in order to maintain a balanced budget. We can then rewrite the
government budget restriction in (33) as φt = h(φp), where ∂φ
t
∂φp < 0. We
have the following result.
Proposition 5 A fully financed increase in the punishment rates, δ or α,
will increase the number of educated workers.
3.5 Unemployment
This section is concerned with how the number of unemployed workers
is aﬀected by changes in the tax and punishment systems. As is clear
from section 2.4, the total number of unemployed workers, as well as the
number of unemployed workers observable by the government, depends on
the division of labour across sectors. Since the division of labour across
sectors depends on the tax rates, φt, separate from the wedge, ψ, we
have to account for the government budget restriction explicitly. Again
we assume that we are located on the positively sloped side of the Laﬀer
curves.20
Proposition 6 A fully financed increase in the punishment rates, δ or
α, will reduce total unemployment, ∂UTOT∂φp < 0 if ψ < 1 and the rate of
unemployed manual workers is higher than the rate of unemployment of
higher educated workers, um > uh.
In the empirically relevant case where unemployment for manual work-
ers is higher than unemployment of educated workers, higher punishment
rates reduce total unemployment. There is both a direct impact from a
reduction in the unemployment rate for manual workers and an indirect
impact through the shift of workers from the manual labour force towards
the educated labour force.
4 Welfare
This section is concerned with welfare analysis and optimal design of tax
and punishment policies. As we showed in Section 3.4, a reduction in the
attractiveness of the informal sector, makes it relatively less attractive to
20 see previous footnote.
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be a manual worker. This induces more workers to educate themselves.
We concluded that increasing the wedge in-between the informal and the
formal sector increases the number of educated workers by reducing the
relative attractiveness to be a manual worker. Consequently, the size of
the wedge is an important determinant for the size of the educated labour
force.
This is essential when considering welfare. If economic policy is con-
ducted so as to fight the underground economy, increasing the punishment
rates will at the same time increase the number of educated workers. In
case the educated labour force is ineﬃciently low, this provides an addi-
tional argument for fighting the informal sector. If, on the other hand, the
educated labour force is ineﬃciency high, combatting the informal sector
induces a welfare cost in the sense that the educated labour force becomes
even higher.
This suggests that punishment rates are potential instruments for in-
creasing the number of educated workers and thereby welfare. There may,
of course, be others more direct instruments if the pure aim is to correct
for ineﬃciencies in the educational level in an economy, but nevertheless,
it should be acknowledged that the wedge actually has an impact on the
number of educated workers and thereby potentially has an impact on
welfare in the economy. This becomes clear if we take a closer look at the
welfare eﬀects of the model.
We make use of a utilitarian welfare function, which is obtained by
adding all individuals’ and firms’ steady state flow values of welfare. In
order to disregard from congestion externalities we assume that γ = η.
The social welfare function is written as:
W = eˆW˜m +
Z 1
eˆ
W˜hde,
where
W˜m = umrUm + nFmrEFm + nImrEIm + nFmrJFm + nImrJIm + vFmrV Fm + vImrV Im,
W˜h = uhrUh + (1− uh)rEh + (1− uh)rJh + vhrVh.
We assume that firms are owned by ”rentiers” who do not work.21
By making use of the asset equations for workers and firms in the three
21Having workers owning equal shares across all existing firms, result in identical
equilibrium outcomes as well as an identical definition of the welfare function in (36).
This can be verified by adding dividends to the worker’s asset functions.
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sectors, imposing the flow equilibrium conditions as well as the government
budget restriction in (33), and considering the case of no discounting, i.e.,
r → 0 , we can write the welfare function as:
W =Wmeˆ+
Z 1
eˆ
Whde− ξ (p) , (36)
where
Wm = (1− um) ym − umΘk, (37)
Wh = (1− uh) yh − uhθhk − c (e) , (38)
where Θ =
³
θIm (σ)β + θFm (1− σ)β
´
.22 With the assumption of risk neu-
tral individuals, we ignore distributional issues and hence wages will not
feature in the welfare function.
Examining the welfare measure in (36) reveals that we have to consider
both how the tax and punishment system aﬀects the welfare of the manual
and highly educated sector, Wm and Wh, but also how it aﬀects the stock
of manual and highly educated workers, 1 − eˆ. We see from the welfare
specification in (36), (37), and (38) that changes in the punishment rates,
δ or α, only aﬀects welfare through its aﬀect on the wedge, ψ. The wedge,
in turn, aﬀects total welfare, W , through its impact on welfare for manual
workers, Wm, and through its impact on the number workers acquiring
education, 1− eˆ. As is clear from (38), Wh is independent of the tax and
punishment rates. Changes in the tax rates, t and z, on the other hand,
aﬀects W through the wedge, ψ, but it will also have a direct eﬀect on the
number of workers acquiring education.
Let us first consider how a change in the number of workers acquir-
ing education aﬀects the social welfare measure. We can conclude the
following:
∂W
∂ (1− eˆ) =Wh (eˆ)−Wm = (1− uh)ωh − c (eˆ)− n
F
mωFm − nImωIm. (39)
Welfare raises when more workers acquire education whenever the
number of educated workers are too low from a welfare point of view.
22This welfare measure is analogous to the welfare meassure described in, for example,
Pissarides (2000) as it gives the aggregate production minus total vacancy costs, i.e. we
note that umΘk =
¡
vF + vI
¢
k. The educational cost is of course added as a cost to the
welfare measure.
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Similarly, welfare falls as more workers acquire education when too many
workers are educated from a welfare perspective.23
By looking at the market solution for the stock of educated workers, it
is clear that it is exclusively the tax and punishment system that distorts
educational choice. The equation for educational choice (32) can be writ-
ten as 1φt
³
(1− uh)ωh − nFωF − 1ψnIωI
´
= c (eˆ) by using the expressions
for rUm and rUh from sections 2.1 and 2.2. We note that there are two
sources through which the tax and punishment system distort the educa-
tional choice, namely through the punishment tax wedge, ψ, and through
the tax rates, φt.
The first distortion on educational choice appears when ψ departs from
unity. When ψ < 1, being a manual worker is rather pleasant as then
attractive employment opportunities in an informal sector are available.
This reduces the incentives of education, which tends to imply that too few
workers educate themselves. For ψ > 1, on the other hand, employment
opportunities in an informal sector are not very attractive as then the
expected punishment rates are higher than the tax rates. This increases
the incentives of education, tending to make too many people educate
themselves. The second distortion on educational choice follows as tax
rates are positive, φt > 1. Taxation hits educated workers more severely
than manual workers, which reduces the incentives of education. Hence,
positive tax rates distort the educational choice such that too few workers
tends to educate themselves.
From this we can conclude that welfare always increases when more
workers educate themselves when ψ ≤ 1. When ψ is smaller than unity
there is an ineﬃciently low stock of educated workers both because positive
tax rates hit educated workers more severely and because manual workers
face attractive informal sector employment opportunities. When ψ = 1,
the fact that tax rates are positive, implies that it is still welfare improving
that more workers educate themselves. When ψ > 1, the punishment of
the informal sector works as an instrument to counteract the distortion
created by the tax rates. Further increases in ψ above unity eventually
fully counteracts the distortion of the tax system, making the market
solution stock of educated workers being socially optimal.
Let us now consider the optimal design of tax and punishment systems.
23This clearly follows by definition asW is concave in (1−eˆ), and reaches its maximum
when (1− uh)ωh − c (eˆ)− nFωF − nIωI = 0.
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Since welfare depends on the division of labour across sectors, and the
labour division depends on the tax rates separate from the wedge, we
choose the punishment rates to maximize welfare accounting for that the
tax rates adjust to balance the government budget restriction. We use (33)
to write the tax rates as a function of the punishment rates as φt = h(φp),
where ∂φ
t
∂φp < 0.24
Maximizing W in equation (36), (37), and (38) with respect to φp
enables us to write the first order condition as:
∂W
∂φp =
∂W
∂ (1− eˆ)
µ
∂ (1− eˆ)
∂φp |φt +
∂ (1− eˆ)
∂φt
|φp ∂φ
t
∂φp
¶
+
∂Wm
∂ψ
µ
∂ψ
∂φp |φt +
∂ψ
∂φt
|φp ∂φ
t
∂φp
¶
= 0
(40)
We can conclude that:
Proposition 7 Welfare is maximized when the punishment rate is chosen
such that the informal sector is punished to a larger extent than the formal
sector is taxed, i.e., ψ∗ > 1.
The Proof is given in the Appendix. In case the government has a
positive revenue requirement, R > 0, tax rates has to be positive, and the
optimal wedge is larger than unity.25
The intuition for the result in proposition 7 follows from that the ed-
ucational stock is ineﬃciently low in case ψ ≤ 1. The first term in (40)
captures how welfare is aﬀected when more workers acquire education. Re-
call from Section 3.4 that the number of educated workers increases with
increased punishment of the informal sector. Hence as welfare always
increases with additional punishment as long as ψ ≤ 1, it is optimal to in-
crease the punishment rates above unity to create incentives for education.
24The tax and punishment rates aﬀect the government revenues in a number of ways
(details are given in an appendix). Considering that we are located on the positively
sloped side of the Laﬀer curves, and hence dynamic adjustments in equilibrium wages,
employment rates and labour forces are not dominating the direct eﬀects, government
revenue increases with increased tax rates and punishment rates. An increase in the
punishment rate accordingly calls for reductions in the tax rates in order to maintain a
balanced budget. Or we could equally well allow for the case where we are located on
the negatively sloped side of the Laﬀer curve, and hence the direct eﬀects are dominated
by the dynamic eﬀects. See appendix for details.
25A zero tax rate also implies that there are no informal sector that can be punished.
Hence it is not possible to obtain the revenue requirements, R unless φt > 1.
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However, the second term in (40) becomes negative when ψ exceeds unity.
This term captures how the value of being a manual worker is aﬀected by
ψ. When ψ deviates from unity there is a distortion between the informal
and the formal sector. Regarding the second term, if ψ < 1, too much
work from a welfare point of view is carried out in the informal sector,
and vice versa when ψ > 1.26 Hence, when ψ < 1, welfare improves when
increasing ψ both because it increases the stock of educated workers and
because it reduces the distortion between the informal and formal sector.
However, when ψ > 1, additional punishment of the informal sector brings
about a negative eﬀect on welfare as it increases the distortion between
the formal and the informal sector. Eventually, further increases in the
punishment rates will induce welfare to fall.
From proposition (7), we can conclude that:
Corollary 8 The number of educated workers are below what is socially
optimal when the punishment rate is chosen optimally, i.e., when ψ = ψ∗.
This follows from the first order condition determining the optimal
punishment rate (40) and equation (39), where the socially optimal num-
ber of educated workers are determined by ∂W∂(1−eˆ) = 0. From (40) we ob-
serve that the welfare maximizing punishment rate is set so that ∂W∂(1−eˆ) >
0, fulfilling the first order condition as the second term is negative for
ψ > 1, which implies that the educated stock is below what is socially op-
timal. This intuitively follows as it is not optimal to set the punishment so
to fully correct for the ineﬃciently low stock of educated workers, as such
a choice implies a distortion between the formal and the informal sector.
As it is a trade-oﬀ between the two distortions, it is never optimal to fully
eliminate one of the them.
The results that the punishment rates should be set such that the in-
formal sector is punished to a larger extent than the formal sector is taxed,
i.e., ψ > 1, should clearly not be taken literally. Merely it points at that
it is potentially important for welfare to acknowledge that employment
opportunities in an informal sector may reduce the incentive to acquire
education.
26This is further made clear by noting that total vacancies per unemployed workers
are maximized, and the manual unemployment rate, is minimized when ψ = 1.
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5 Conclusion
This paper has examined the consequences of the fact that work opportu-
nities in the informal sector mainly face workers at the lower end of the
skill distribution. When considering the individual choice of higher educa-
tion, we usually think that the wage premium of education and the relative
employment probabilities are the important factors to weight against the
cost of education. However, acknowledging that mainly manual or service
sector workers face work opportunities in the informal sector, these work-
ers may have much better employment perspectives than what is revealed
by just considering formal sector wages and unemployment rates. Hence,
informal sector employment opportunities may reduce the incentives to
acquire higher education and thereby reduce the educated labour force.
This paper developed a three-sector general equilibrium model featur-
ing matching frictions and worker-firm wage bargains. Workers diﬀered
with respect to ability, and the choice of education was endogenously de-
termined. Job opportunities in an informal sector where only available to
manual workers. We asked if increased punishment of the informal sec-
tor and/or reduced taxation induced more workers to educate themselves.
The answer to that question was yes, and the story just told provides the
intuition behind this result.
The second aim of this paper was to study how labour market per-
formance, and in particular unemployment, where aﬀected by increased
punishment of the informal sector and/or reduced taxation. Although
some recent studies have shed light on how punishment policies aﬀects
unemployment, this papers uses a framework which enabled us to study
the impact of tax and punishment policies when workers are searching in
both a formal and an informal sector.
Finally, the paper characterized the optimal tax and punishment sys-
tem. We showed that it was optimal to punish the informal sector to a
larger extent than the formal sector is taxed. The results show that it po-
tentially is important to take into account the impact of the employment
opportunities in the informal sector on education, as it in turn, may have
consequences for welfare. Punishing the informal sector less severely may
reduce the educated labour force and welfare.
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6 Appendix
6.1 Equilibrium
We will draw the equilibrium for the manual sector in a diagram with
search intensity, σ, on the first axis and relative tightness on the second
axis, θ
F
θI . We draw two curves, one representing the two first equilibrium
equations, (28) and (29), denoted θ
F
θI (σ) , that is we have relative labour
market tightness as a function of search intensity, σ. The other curve
represents equation (30), where we have search intensity as a function of
relative tightness, σ
³
θF
θI
´
.
Consider the case when η = 12 . In this case we can solve explicitly for
labour market tightness in the two sectors, and then deriving θ
F
θI (σ) we can
show that the slope is negative,
∂ θ
F
θI
∂σ | θF
θI
(σ) < 0. That is, a higher search
intensity into the informal sector reduces relative labour market tightness.
Furthermore, the curve is independent of the wedge, ψ. The curve repre-
senting equation (30), σ
³
θF
θI
´
, also has a negative slope,
∂ θ
F
θI
∂σ |σ³ θF
θI
´ < 0,
corresponding to that search intensity in the informal sector decreases
with relative labour market tightness as job opportunities becomes rel-
atively better in the formal sector. An increase in the wedge shifts the
curve, σ
³
θF
θI
´
, inwards. Considering ∂
θF
θI
∂σ |σ³ θF
θI
´ and ∂ θFθI∂σ | θF
θI
(σ) we can
show that the slope σ
³
θF
θI
´
is steeper than the slope of θ
F
θI (σ). Given that
an equilibrium exists it will therefore be unique and stable. See the next
section for intuition for stability. We illustrate this in Figure 1 for ψ < 1.
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The steeper curve represents σ
³
θF
θI
´
, and θ
F
θI (σ) is the flatter curve.
6.2 The impact from an increase in the wedge
When the wedge increases, the search intensity curve, σ
³
θF
θI
´
, that is,
the steeper curve, shifts inwards to σ0
³
θF
θI
´
. The relative labour market
tightness, θ
F
θI (σ) , curve is not aﬀected. The new equilibrium is where
the new search intensity curve, σ0
³
θF
θI
´
, and the relative labour market
tightness curve, θ
F
θI (σ) , intersect. See Figure 2.
When the punishment rates increase relative to the tax rates, ψ in-
creases, search intensity falls for given relative labour market tightness,
θF
θI . We move from the initial equilibrium horizontally to the left till the
new search intensity curve is reached. A lower search intensity increases
relative tightness as it induces a reduction in formal producer wages and
an increase in informal producer wages. In the diagram, this corresponds
to a vertical movement until we reach the relative labour market tightness
curve. This, in turn, causes another reduction in search intensity, how-
ever the impact is now smaller than before. And again, the decrease in σ
implies that relative tightness increases. The impacts become smaller and
smaller until the new equilibrium is reached.
6.3 Proofs of Propositions and Lemmas
Proof of proposition 1:
Proof. Diﬀerentiating equations (28), (29) and (30) with respect to
ψ gives:
∂θFm
∂ψ =
(1− β) γkθFm
³
ηk (r + s+ p)
¡
θIm
¢η−1
+ γkσβ−1
´
D1 (1− σ)2−β
> 0,
∂θIm
∂ψ = −
(1− β) γkθIm
³
ηk (r + s)
¡
θFm
¢η−1
+ γk (1− σ)β−1
´
D1σ2−β
< 0,
∂σ
∂ψ = −
µ
ηk r+s+p
(θIm)
1−η + γkσβ−1
¶µ
ηk r+s
(θFm)
1−η + γk (1− σ)β−1
¶
D1
< 0,
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whereD1 = k2 (1− β) θ
I
m
θFm
η
(r+s)
(θFm)
1−η γσβ+
r+s+p
(θIm)
1−η
Ã
(1−σ)β+ η(r+s)
(θFm)
1−η
!
σ2−β(1−σ)β > 0. From
equation (31) it is apparent that tightness in sector h is not aﬀected by
changes in the tax or punishment rates. A closer look at (33) reveals that
the government can choose φt and φp = ψφt for a given ψ so to increase
or reduce revenues in order to balance its budget as long as R is a feasible
revenue requirement. We do not need not have to assume that we are
located on the positively sloped side of the Laﬀer curves.
Proof of Proposition 2:
Proof. Diﬀerentiate (13) and (14) with respect to ψ, considering that
θFm, θIm, and σ is aﬀected according to (28), (29), and (30) gives:
∂ωFm
∂ψ = (1− σ)
β−1 γk
µ
∂θFm
∂ψ −
(β − 1) θFm
1− σ
∂σ
∂ψ
¶
,
∂ωIm
∂ψ = γkσ
β−1
µ
∂θIm
∂ψ + (β − 1)
θIm
σ
∂σ
∂ψ
¶
,
which can be rewritten making use of the proof to proposition 1 as
∂ωFm
∂ψ = −
γk2 (1− β)
D1 (1− σ)2−β
Ã
η (r + s+ p)¡
θIm
¢1−η + γσβ−1
!
η (r + s)
¡
θFm
¢η < 0,
∂ωIm
∂ψ =
γk2 (1− β)
D1σ2−β
Ã
η (r + s)¡
θFm
¢1−η + γ (1− σ)β−1
!
η (r + s+ p)
¡
θIm
¢η > 0.
From (21) and (22) we observe that wages in sector h is not aﬀected by
changes in the tax and punishment rates. The reform is fully financed, see
proof of proposition (1).
Proof of Proposition 3:
Proof. Diﬀerentiating the employment equation, (25), with respect
to ψ gives:
∂nIm
∂ψ =
∂λIm
∂ψ
¡
s+ λFm
¢
− λIm
∂λFm
∂ψ
s (s+ p)
³
1 + λ
I
m
s+p +
λFm
s
´2 < 0, ∂nFm∂ψ =
∂λFm
∂ψ
¡
s+ p+ λIm
¢
− λFm
∂λIm
∂ψ
s (s+ p)
³
1 + λ
I
m
s+p +
λFm
s
´2 > 0,
as the transition rate into the formal manual sector unambiguously in-
creases and the transition rate into the informal sector decreases. Fur-
thermore, the actual unemployment rate and the oﬃcial unemployment
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rate are aﬀected in the following way:
∂um
∂ψ = −
σβ
s+p
¡
θIm
¢1−η ³ (1−η)
θIm
∂θIm
∂ψ +
β
σ
∂σ
∂ψ
´
+ (1−σ)
β
s
¡
θFm
¢1−η ³ (1−η)
θFm
∂θFm
∂ψ −
β
1−σ
∂σ
∂ψ
´
³
1 + λ
I
m
s+p +
λFm
s
´2
= −u2m
(1− σ)β−1
s
¡
θFm
¢η µ−β ∂σ∂ψθFm
µ
1− ψρ
¶
+
(1− η) (1− β) γk
D1σ1−β
Λ
¶
< 0 if ψ < 1,
∂uom
∂ψ = −
∂nFm
∂ψ < 0, (41)
where ρ = s+ps
³
θIm
θFm
´η
and Λ = η
³
1
ψ −
ψ
ρ
´
(1− γ) ym+
³
1− ψρ
´
(1− η) γkθ
F
m
(1−σ)1−β .
For r = 0 we have that ρ =
(1−γ)ym−ψ γkθ
F
m
(1−σ)1−β
(1−γ)ym− γkθ
Fm
(1−σ)1−β
R 1 for ψ Q 1 using the
labour market tightness equations. Now, for r > 0,
(1−γ)ym−ψ γkθ
F
m
(1−σ)1−β
(1−γ)ym− γkθ
Fm
(1−σ)1−β
<
ρ, hence for ψ ≤ 1 is ψρ < 1. The unemployment rate in sector h is unaf-
fected by changes in the tax and punishment system as can be seen from
(27), (22) and λh = (θh)1−η. The reform is fully financed, see proof of
proposition 1.
Proof of Proposition 4:
Proof. Wages in sector h are unaﬀected by the change in ψ and hence
wage dispersion WD increases as ∂ω
F
m
∂ψ < 0 from the proof of proposition
2.
Proof of Proposition 5:
Proof. The impact on the number of educated workers of a fully
financed change in the punishment rates, φp, is given by
∂ (1− eˆ)
∂φp =
∂ (1− eˆ)
∂φp |φt +
∂ (1− eˆ)
∂φt
|φp ∂φ
t
∂φp . (42)
Using equation (34), (35) and ∂φ
t
∂φp < 0, we obtain that
∂(1−eˆ)
∂φp > 0.
Proof of Proposition 6:
Proof. The impact on the total number of unemployed workers of a
fully financed increase in φp is given by
∂UTOT
∂φp =
∂eˆ
∂φp (um − uh) + eˆ
∂um
∂ψ
µ
∂ψ
∂φp |φt +
∂ψ
∂φt
|φp ∂φ
t
∂φp
¶
, (43)
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which is smaller than zero for um > uh as ∂eˆ∂φp < 0 from (42) and
∂um
∂ψ < 0
if ψ < 1 and ∂φ
t
∂φp < 0. The total number of oﬃcially unemployed workers
is aﬀected in the following way
∂UoTOT
∂φp =
∂eˆ
∂φp (u
o
m − uh) + eˆ
∂uom
∂ψ
∂ψ
∂φp , (44)
which has negative sign as uom > um and
∂uom
∂ψ < 0.
Proof of Proposition 7:
Proof. The first order condition is given by:
∂W
∂φp =
∂W
∂ (1− eˆ)
µ
∂ (1− eˆ)
∂φp |φt +
∂ (1− eˆ)
∂φt
|φp ∂φ
t
∂φp
¶
+
∂Wm
∂ψ
µ
∂ψ
∂φp |φt +
∂ψ
∂φt
|φp ∂φ
t
∂φp
¶
= 0.
(45)
Consider the first term, where
∂W
∂ (1− eˆ) = (1− uh)ωh − c (eˆ)− n
F
mωFm − nImωIm,
and
³
∂(1−eˆ)
∂φp |φt + ∂(1−eˆ)∂φt |φp
∂φt
∂φp
´
> 0. Comparing to the equation for educa-
tional choice (32), which can be written as 1φt
³
(1− uh)ωh − nFωF − 1ψnIωI
´
−
c (eˆ) = 0, we infer that ∂W∂(1−eˆ) > 0 for ψ < ψ˜,
∂W
∂(1−eˆ) = 0 for ψ = ψ˜,
∂W
∂(1−eˆ) < 0 for ψ > ψ˜ where where ψ˜ > 1 is the wedge that implies the so-
cially optimal educational stock. Hence, considering the first term, welfare
increases in φp until ψ = ψ˜ and thereafter it decreases with φp.
Consider the last term where
∂Wm
∂ψ = −
∂um
∂ψ A− umBk, (46)
whereA = (ym +Θk) , B =
³
∂θIm
∂ψ σβ +
∂θFm
∂ψ (1− σ)
β + β θ
I
m
σ1−β
³
1− 1ψ
´
∂σ
∂ψ
´
and
³
∂ψ
∂φp |φt + ∂ψ∂φt |φp
∂φt
∂φp
´
> 0. We can show that ∂Wm∂ψ is concave in ψ.
From the proofs of proposition 1 and proposition 3 and using equation
(30) we can show that the term is positive for ψ < 1, zero for ψ = 1, and
negative for ψ > 1. Recall here that s
¡
θFm
¢η
= (s+ p)
¡
θIm
¢η
if ψ = 1 and
r = 0.
Hence, welfare increases with φp when ψ ≤ 1, and falls with φp when
ψ ≥ ψ˜. For 1 < ψ < ψ˜, welfare most likely increases with φp in order to
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reach a maximum at ψ∗ and then falls again. This most likely holds as
∂W
∂(1−eˆ) becomes smaller and smaller when φ
p increases within this interval,
and ∂Wm∂ψ becomes more and more negative within this interval. However,
in the general case we can not rule out that
³
∂(1−eˆ)
∂φp |φt + ∂(1−eˆ)∂φt |φp
∂φt
∂φp
´
and
³
∂ψ
∂φp |φt + ∂ψ∂φt |φp
∂φt
∂φp
´
take on values such that the sign of ∂W∂φp takes on
both positive and negative values in this interval, although it seems quite
unlikely. Although we cannot rule out this case, it is of no importance for
Proposition 7. This follows as the maximum is found within this interval,
although one may have more than one stationary point. It is then just a
matter of choosing the stationary point which yields the highest welfare.
6.4 Impact on government Revenue
The left hand side (LHS) of (33) is the government revenue, whereas the
right hand side is the government revenue requirement. Diﬀerentiating
the LHS of (33) with respect to φp and φt gives the following expressions:
∂LHS
∂φp |φt =
∂eˆ
∂ψ
∂ψ
∂φp
µ
nFmωFm
µ
1− 1
φt
¶
+ nImωIm(1−
1
φp )− nhωh
µ
1− 1
φt
¶¶
+eˆ ∂ψ∂φp
µ
∂nFm
∂ψ ω
F
m
µ
1− 1
φt
¶
+
∂nIm
∂ψ ω
I
m
µ
1− 1φp
¶¶
+eˆ ∂ψ∂φp
µ
∂ωFm
∂ψ n
F
m
µ
1− 1
φt
¶
+
∂ωIm
∂ψ n
I
m
µ
1− 1φp
¶¶
+eˆnImωIm
1
(φp)2
∂LHS
∂φt
|φp =
µ
∂eˆ
∂ψ
∂ψ
∂φt
+
∂eˆ
∂φt
|ψ
¶µ
nFmωFm
µ
1− 1
φt
¶
+ nImωIm(1−
1
φp )− nhωh
µ
1− 1
φt
¶¶
+eˆ ∂ψ
∂φt
µ
∂nFm
∂ψ ω
F
m
µ
1− 1
φt
¶
+
∂nIm
∂ψ ω
I
m
µ
1− 1φp
¶¶
+eˆ ∂ψ
∂φt
µ
∂ωFm
∂ψ n
F
m
µ
1− 1
φt
¶
+
∂ωIm
∂ψ n
I
m
µ
1− 1φp
¶¶
+eˆn
F
mωFm¡
φt
¢2 + (1− eˆ)(1− uh)ω2h¡φt¢2
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We can divide the influences on the government revenue into four cat-
egories characterized by each row in the two equations. The first row in
each equation captures how revenues are altered by the change in the num-
ber of educated workers in the economy. The second row in each equation
gives the impact on revenues as employment in the formal and informal
sector is altered. The third row in each equation captures how revenues
are influenced by changes in the equilibrium producer wage facing manual
workers. Finally, the fourth row gives the direct eﬀect. We have assumed
that the auditing costs are independent of ψ. However, it is straightfor-
ward to assume that is a function of, for example, ψ. This simply adds an
additional eﬀect on the government revenue.
Since the dynamic eﬀects move in diﬀerent directions it is diﬃcult to
determine whether they reinforce or weaken the direct eﬀect. If we say
that we are located on the upward sloping part of the Laﬀer curves, we
assume that ∂LHS∂φp |φt > 0 and ∂LHS∂φt |φp > 0. That is, the dynamic ef-
fects will never dominate the direct eﬀect. Rewrite (33) as G
¡
φp, φt
¢
=
eˆ
³
nFmωFm
³
1− 1φt
´
+ nImωIm(1− 1φp )
´
+(1−eˆ) (1− uh)ωh
³
1− 1φt
´
−ξ (p)−
R = 0. Diﬀerentiating G
¡
φp, φt
¢
with respect to φp and φt yields ∂φ
t
∂φp =
−
∂G(.)
∂φp
∂G(.)
∂φt
= −
∂LHS
∂φp
∂LHS
∂φt
< 0, which is used in the proofs of propositions (5), (6),
(10), (11) and Lemmas (8), (9).
If we instead assume that the direct eﬀect is dominated by indirect
negative eﬀects, we assume that ∂LHS∂φp < 0 and
∂LHS
∂φt < 0. This is referred
to as that we are located on the downward sloping side of the Laﬀer curves.
This implies that ∂φ
t
∂φp = −
∂G(.)
∂φp
∂G(.)
∂φt
= −
∂LHS
∂φp
∂LHS
∂φt
< 0. Hence propositions (5),
(6), (10), (11) and Lemmas (8), (9) holds also in this case. Propositions
(5), (6), (10), (11) and Lemmas (8), (9), however, do not hold if we have
sign ∂LHS∂φp |φt 6= sign ∂LHS∂φt |φp .
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